39
law of tort, property and contract as embodying an ‘autonomous private order’.
7
However, recognising
that both private law (through common law) and public law (through statutes) intervene in private
contractual arrangements by adding or forbidding terms may change the traditional dichotomous view.
The particular intervention, as well as the effects of, and justification for, intervention by courts or the
legislature into private contracts should be analysed. Intervention must be built on realistic assumptions
about how parties behave and react to common law rules and statutes
8
as well as an assessment of how
such legal interventions will serve parties’ private goals, or more broadly public ones – thus bringing
social context into contract law. A comparative approach should also ask: why does intervention follow
one course rather than another? What approach will best improve goal achievement after accounting
for the costs of intervention?
When is a statutory or common law intervention welfare-enhancing as compared to goal
achievement without intervention?
9
The assessment of intervention by these various ‘institutions’
10
must be made on a comparative basis.
11
How much, and in what circumstances, should legislatures
intervene? When is the legislature better or worse than common law courts in intervening, and why?
At one level, because contracts are devised in societies governed by statutes, the parties to
those contracts must be subject to those laws. A key question, as yet undertheorised, is why and when
7
ibid 885–86. Property, tort and contract operated fundamentally to protect private rights.
8
The examination of the influence of statutes on contract law necessarily differs from examining the effects of
statutes on tort law in one important respect – statutes affecting contract law must consider that parties have the
ability to craft agreements ex ante in a way that tort actors do not. For a thoughtful exploration of the effects of
statutes on tort law, see TT Arvind and J Steel, ‘Introduction: Legislation and the Scope of Tort Law’ in TT Arvind
and J Steele (eds), Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2013). That difference affects intervention
choices by the legislature. For a discussion of the realistic behavioral assumptions affecting transacting parties see
OE Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, The Free Press, 1985) 44–50.
9
Assessing welfare enhancement must include a comparative assessment of whether intervention by a legislature
or court will help the parties achieve their desired goals without introducing costs that reduce the overall net
benefits when compared to non-intervention. As Professor Coffey explains: ‘the intervention must promise a net-
of-cognizable-intervention-costs improvement of goal achievement (as compared to the level of desired effect
reached without intervention)’. RJ Coffey, ‘Methodological Perspective’ (2002) 6 A manuscript by my colleague.
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10
If broadly defined, courts, private exchanges and statutes are institutions. ‘Institutions define and limit the set of
choices of individuals.’ DC North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance 4, 2nd edn
(Cambridge University Press. USA1990). ‘Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to
shape human interaction.’ ibid. These institutions also extend to private organisations like the New York Stock
Exchange, which establishes rules to govern the voluntary arrangements of participants who join. See, eg, the NYSE
Rules, at http://wallstreet.cch.com/nyse/rules (2019).
11
See O Williamson, Mechanisms of Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996) 7 (discussing
remediableness ‘according to which an outcome for which no superior alternative can be described with net gains
is presumed to be efficient’); N Komesar, ‘In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A Comparative
Institutional Alternative’ (1980) 79 Michigan Law Review 1350, 1350 (examining different decision-makers and
evaluating them according to a criterion of ‘choosing the best, or least imperfect, institution to implement a given
societal goal’). In this chapter, a comparative analysis also assesses legal intervention against leaving the solution
to parties’ private strategies.